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On November 10, 2012, Geraldo Cadava admonished 
Americans in an op-ed piece in the New York Times to keep in 
mind the importance of  “warm relations in the hemisphere” 
when dealing with immigration and of  pursuing an approach 
that “will strengthen our partnerships” in the region (Cadava 
2012, 21). Being able to get along with regional neighbors is 
important given not only immigration issues but also trade 
partnerships, economic development concerns, and cultural 
exchanges. Countries depend on citizen support for transna-
tional policies that demand regional cooperation and that can 
drastically affect the state of  the economy and, more broadly, 
regional relationships. Determining what increases support 
for transnational policies is therefore pivotal in an increas-
ingly globalized world.
Research on attitudes toward specific transnational poli-
cies, such as trade agreements and immigration, often high-
light policy-specific explanations. Building upon research 
on foreign policy attitudes where trust has been a key vari-
able explaining militarist or cooperative foreign policy so-
lutions, we contend that support for regional transnational 
policies—policies that involve one’s country working closely 
with neighboring countries— fundamentally rests on trust, 
not merely generalized trust, but particularly trust in for-
eigners. The more individuals trust people from other coun-
tries in their region, the more accepting they will be of  poli-
cies that necessarily increase interactions between their own 
country and neighboring countries and between citizens and 
foreigners. Therefore, this article’s empirical analyses are de-
voted to assessing the relationship between trust in foreign-
ers as our key independent variable and support for a host 
of  regional transnational policies, specifically immigration, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
the possibility of  international integration.
We believe that both the theoretical and empirical contri-
butions of  this study will be of  interest to scholars interested 
in the vast body of  literature on political trust and on atti-
tudes toward international public affairs. From a theoretical 
standpoint, we argue that clarifying the target of  social trust 
is essential for understanding the relationship between trust 
and transnational policy attitudes. Indeed, some work has 
shown that public opinion toward some transnational poli-
cies (including international trade) is significantly influenced 
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by intergroup attitudes such as ethnocentrism (e.g., Mans-
field and Mutz, 2009, 2013). Therefore, it is important to ac-
count for which group the policy evokes in the public’s mind. 
We contend that distinguishing trust in foreigners from gen-
eralized trust is a critical step in advancing knowledge on this 
matter, and this study aims to steer the debate in this direc-
tion. From an empirical point of  view, this study provides 
evidence of  the relationship between trust in foreigners and 
support for regional transnational policies stepping outside 
of  the dominant setting of  advanced industrial democra-
cies. Mexico is an emerging democracy that participates in 
NAFTA along with the United States and Canada. In addi-
tion, Mexico often has to deal with immigration issues of  its 
own and is constantly faced with the possibility of  increased 
regional integration with its powerful neighbor to the north, 
making this country an ideal case for the purposes of  our 
study. In the following section, we offer our theoretical ar-
guments regarding the relationship between regional trans-
national policy attitudes and trust in foreigners.
Transnational Policy Attitudes and Trust
Foreign policy issues are difficult for most people to under-
stand because they are “exceptionally complex and ambigu-
ous. International events that occur around the globe are re-
mote, fluid, and extraordinarily complicated” (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987, 1103). Whereas early research on foreign policy 
attitudes suggested that these attitudes were somewhat random 
and unstable (see, for example, Almond 1950; Converse 1964), 
the more recent view is that people can and do make sense of  
foreign policy and that these attitudes are often rational (e.g., 
Holsti 1996; Page and Barabas 2000; Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). Even if  people have only limited 
information, they draw on core values and predispositions to 
make sense of  the complexity and ambiguity of  foreign pol-
icy concerns and to make decisions on foreign policies (Hur-
witz and Peffley 1987; Popkin and Dimock 2000).
Regional transnational policies, as we define them, are a 
type of  cooperative foreign policy that involves neighboring 
states or states within a circumscribed region.1 Events that oc-
cur around the world can affect any given country, but rela-
tions with neighboring countries can take on a special mean-
ing. Neighborhood relations on an individual level matter in 
everyday life, playing a key role in the development of  social 
capital. We argue that neighborhood relations matter on a 
state level as well. States that cooperate with each other can 
solve transnational policy concerns, such as increasing eco-
nomic development through trade agreements, pursuing re-
gional integration in culture and politics, and dealing effec-
tively with immigration issues. As a type of  foreign policy, 
however, regional transnational policies are complicated and 
relatively remote, and people usually have little information 
upon which to develop attitudes about them.
Trust has been shown to be a key predictor of  foreign 
policy attitudes in general, and we expect it to be a key pre-
dictor of  transnational policy attitudes as well. The higher 
people’s level of  trust, the less they support isolationism, mil-
itarist and aggressive solutions to foreign policy problems, 
and heightened defense spending (see, for example, Bartels 
1994; Binning 2007; Brewer et al. 2004; Brewer and Steen-
bergen 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 1990). More trusting indi-
viduals are also likely to be more supportive of  involvement 
in free trade agreements (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002; Pop-
kin and Dimock 2000) and open immigration policies (Her-
reros and Criado 2009; Popkin and Dimock 2000).
Two forms of  trust are particularly relevant when analyz-
ing attitudes toward foreign policies: political trust (trust in 
government) and social trust (trust in people). Political trust 
can be defined “as the degree to which people perceive the 
government is producing outcomes consistent with their ex-
pectations” (Hetherington 2005, 9). The concept of  political 
trust is occasionally confounded with the related concepts of  
support and approval (see Maloy 2009, 493 for a discussion 
of  this point), although efforts have been made to distinguish 
among them (Citrin and Luks 2001). Political trust involves ex-
pectations about the future behavior of government or govern-
ment actors (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2001; Levi 1998), 
whereas support and approval are based on assessments of  
what the government has already done. Social trust, the main 
focus of  our research, is much less likely to be discussed in 
terms of  support or approval and instead rests on the nature 
of  who is being trusted. Particularized or interpersonal trust 
focuses on individuals the person knows or interacts with, 
whereas generalized trust concerns people in general, includ-
ing strangers and nonspecified others (Nannestad 2008). Gen-
eralized trust is a standing decision people use to give others 
the benefit of  the doubt (Rahn and Transue 1998).
The importance of  generalized trust is straightforward 
and perhaps best laid out by Brewer and Steenbergen (2002, 
41–43): beliefs about human nature, specifically how trust-
worthy, honest, and well-intentioned people believe others to 
be, act as a standing decision rule they can use when think-
ing about how other nations will behave. Foreign policy con-
siderations naturally involve “thin trust,” which is trust in a 
“generalized other,” rather than “thick trust,” the trust de-
veloped through personal relations (Putnam 2000: 136; see 
also Rahn and Transue 1998). As Uslaner (2002, 3) argues, 
people who trust the generalized other assume shared values 
and “accept the argument that they have common bonds that 
make cooperation vital.” In the sphere of  international pol-
itics where “thick trust” is impossible and people have little 
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concrete information upon which to base their judgments, 
“thin trust” serves as a simple heuristic that emphasizes co-
operation with other nations.
A major problem with this research, however, is the am-
biguity concerning the target of  trust. Most of  the research 
on trust and foreign policy attitudes uses generalized trust, 
or trust in an unspecified other. To measure generalized 
trust, researchers usually ask respondents whether peo-
ple can be trusted, whether they are driven by self-interest, 
whether they are fair, and so on. But what do respondents 
have in mind when they answer these questions? It makes 
sense to think that “people” refers to all humans, but it is 
not clear that this is the referent people use when answer-
ing the question (see, for example, Reeskens and Hooghe 
2008; Stolle 1998).
Political scientists themselves seem not to have come to 
a consensus on the referent for the generalized trust ques-
tions. Binning (2007) argues that “people” is a superordinate 
category that includes all human beings. Rahn and Transue 
(1998, 545) refer to “most people—even those whom one 
does not know from direct experience.” Uslaner (2002) em-
phasizes the notion that “people” refers to people we do not 
know, people who are strangers to us. Putnam (2000, 136) 
discusses thin trust as covering those “beyond the roster of  
people whom we can know personally” and uses as an ex-
ample a “new acquaintance from the coffee shop.” Popkin 
and Dimock (2000, 230) suggest that trust is much more cir-
cumscribed when they refer to “the very people who distrust 
their neighbors” as those who are low in trust.
Another option is that when asked the generalized trust 
questions, people bring to mind their fellow nationals. Bin-
ning (2007, 793) asked respondents, who were presumably 
Americans, to indicate their trust in people in general and 
in Americans. The correlation between these two targets of  
trust is very high (r = .77, p < .001), suggesting the possibil-
ity that the referent people have in mind when asked whether 
people can be trusted is their fellow nationals. In other words, 
generalized trust might reflect trust in “people like us” rather 
than people around the world.
Recent research on social trust confirms that we should 
be skeptical about whether the trust measures actually mea-
sure trust in a generalized other (Delhey, Newton, and Wel-
zel 2011; Freitag and Bauer 2013; Gundelach 2014; Stur-
gis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011). When people 
in Great Britain were asked in a think-aloud exercise what 
referent they had in mind as they answered whether most 
people could be trusted or you cannot be too careful, 30 per-
cent said people known to them (family, friends, neighbors, 
etc.) or people in their local area. Not many more, 35 per-
cent, said unknown others (Sturgis and Smith 2010, 87). The 
difficulty of  interpreting responses to the generalized trust 
questions becomes especially pronounced in cross-cultural 
research (Torpe and Lolle 2011) where the dynamics of  re-
sponses to generalized trust, trust in strangers, and trust in 
people of  different religions or nationalities across different 
countries are pronounced.
We argue that clarifying the target of  social trust is es-
sential for understanding the relationship between trust and 
transnational policy attitudes. Generalized trust does not nec-
essarily encompass trust in foreigners, yet it is the latter that 
should be more relevant to foreign policy attitudes. If  peo-
ple answer the generalized trust question thinking about fam-
ily, friends, and neighbors (Sturgis and Smith 2010), much 
of  the argument about the relationship between generalized 
trust and foreign policy attitudes seems questionable. The 
findings on cross-cultural variation in how people respond 
to different referents to the trust questions also raise serious 
concerns. Research on the relationship between trust and for-
eign policy attitudes has primarily been done in the United 
States with American respondents. When doing research in 
a non- U.S. setting, we cannot be certain that respondents 
have the same “people” in mind as American respondents. 
Our research includes questions on both generalized trust 
and trust in foreigners, a key referent, we suspect, when it 
comes to transnational policy attitudes.2
We focus on support for three transnational policy areas 
that involve Mexico with its neighbors: the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), immigration policy, and 
regional integration. NAFTA, implemented in 1994, was de-
signed to remove trade barriers between the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada by eliminating many tariffs and phas-
ing out other tariffs over time. Early research on Mexicans’ 
attitudes toward NAFTA found strong support for NAFTA 
among Mexicans, although those with higher status occu-
pations and those who supported the parties on the right 
were more supportive than other Mexicans (Davis 1998). Full 
elimination of  tariffs was in place by 2008. NAFTA has been 
hailed as a success by many, but unions and consumer-advo-
cacy groups point to problems with outsourcing and lower 
wages that they say have had an especially negative impact 
on the United States and Mexico. In particular, critics point 
to the displacement of  Mexican agricultural workers caused 
by NAFTA (Aguilar 2012).
Immigration is also an important transnational issue in 
Mexico. Americans tend to focus on Mexican immigrants 
coming into the United States and Europeans on immigrants 
coming into the European Union. Not surprisingly, research 
on immigration focuses on these two parts of  the world. Very 
little research exists on Mexicans’ attitudes toward immi-
gration, even though Mexico is the destination country for 
many people from around the world, particularly from the 
United States but also from South and Central America, Eu-
rope (particularly from Spain), and East Asia. Mexico also 
serves as a transit route for people from Central and South 
540 Wals et  al .  in  Pol it ical  Research Quarterly  68 (2015) 
America emigrating to the United States. Mexicans there-
fore experience the positives and negatives of  having many 
immigrants in their country yet we know little about what 
drives their opinions about immigration.
Finally, we examine people’s reactions to regional integra-
tion, in particular integration with the United States. Mex-
icans have a very large, powerful, and wealthy neighbor sit-
ting right to their north, a neighbor that can both threaten 
Mexicans’ sense of  autonomy and identity and offer oppor-
tunities to improve their quality of  life. The more integrated 
Mexico and the United States are, the more Mexicans could 
lose their cultural and political identity but the more they 
could benefit from the United States’ wealth. We examine 
attitudes toward regional integration both in terms of  im-
proving Mexicans’ quality of  life and in terms of  cultural 
and political integration.
We hypothesize that trust in foreigners, rather than gen-
eralized trust, will significantly influence public support for 
NAFTA, more open immigration policies, and regional in-
tegration with the United States. Research on generalized 
trust has found that “people with little faith in human nature 
tend to have a different outlook on foreign policy than people 
who trust in the good will of  others” (Brewer and Steenber-
gen 2002, 54). Our basic contention is that when it comes to 
transnational policy issues, what should matter most is trust 
in foreigners, the out-group these policy issues are most likely 
to evoke in the public’s mind. For instance, recent work has 
shown that Americans’ preferences for immigration policy 
are molded by implicit attitudes toward Latino immigrants 
(Pérez 2010). Overall, we believe trust in foreigners will have 
the biggest impact on support for regional transnational pol-
icies, bigger than the more general generalized trust.
Data and Method
In this section, we introduce our data and present our 
main empirical findings. Recall here that we are interested 
in assessing if  trust in foreigners, controlling for generalized 
trust, is a key explanatory factor for a host of  attitudes and 
preferences regarding regional transnational policies, namely, 
immigration, international trade agreements (using the case 
of  NAFTA), and international regional integration. We ex-
pect that, all else equal, individuals with higher levels of  
trust in foreigners should be more likely to display prefer-
ences for less restrictive immigration policies, for increased 
access to international markets, and generalized support for 
regional international integration. To test whether such re-
lationships exist, we take advantage of  the National Bank of  
Mexico’s (Banamex) Division for Economic and Sociopolitical Stud-
ies 2003 Mexican Values Survey. The original survey was con-
ducted among a nationally representative sample of  2,380 
Mexican citizens during June of  2003 right before the mid-
term federal election of  that year. The theoretical margin 
of  error for the entire sample size of  the survey is ±2 per-
cent. The survey was sponsored by a private financial insti-
tution, designed following professional standards in survey 
research, and fielded by Trabajos Especializados de Campo, S.A. 
(see Moreno 2005).3
Dependent Variables: Immigration, NAFTA, and 
Blurred Borderlines
The first dependent variable, immigration policy preferences, 
is constructed using a question asking respondents about the 
circumstances under which immigration should be allowed, 
where 0 denotes that immigration “should not be allowed” 
under any circumstance (14.9 percent of  respondents), 1 de-
notes “strict limits should be imposed on the number of  peo-
ple allowed in the country” (22.4 percent), 2 denotes that im-
migration “should be allowed only if  there are jobs available” 
(46.7 percent), and 3 denotes an open door policy where 
“anyone should be allowed to enter the country” (12.2 per-
cent). The remaining 3.8 percent of  the sample did not pro-
vide an answer to this question.
The second dependent variable, trust in NAFTA, is con-
structed using responses to a question asking respondents 
how much they trust the NAFTA, where 0 denotes “no trust 
at all” in NAFTA (23.9 percent of  respondents), 1 denotes 
“little” trust (32.8 percent), 2 denotes “some” trust (28.9 per-
cent), and 3 denotes that the respondent trusts NAFTA “very 
much” (8.7 percent). The remaining 5.7 percent of  the sam-
ple did not provide an answer to this question and are not 
included in this analysis.
The third and fourth dependent variables are additive in-
dexes constructed from five items on respondents’ level of  
agreement with hypothetical scenarios depicting Mexico and 
the United States merging into one single country under dif-
ferent circumstances. Respondents were asked whether they 
would favor or oppose Mexico and the United States form-
ing one single country if  doing so would mean (1) having a 
better lifestyle, (2) Mexico losing its cultural identity, (3) be-
ing better able to deal with problems related to security and 
drug trafficking, (4) Mexico joining as thirty-two new states 
of  the United States, and, (5) having an overall better qual-
ity of  life. Response options range from “strongly against” 
(0) to “strongly in favor” (4).
Exploratory factor analysis shows that these five items 
load onto two separate dimensions. We labeled the first one 
the quality of  life dimension (scenarios 1, 3, and 5). The three 
items load into one dimension with a minimum factor load-
ing of  0.860 and a maximum factor loading of  0.917, and 
produce a reliable scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of  0.875. 
After adding the responses of  these three items our final 
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scale ranges from 0 to 12. We labeled the second one the 
cultural identity and political autonomy dimension (scenarios 2 
and 4). Both of  these items load onto one dimension with 
a loading factor of  0.866, and produce a reliable scale with 
a Cronbach’s alpha of  0.660. After adding these responses, 
the final scale ranges from 0 to 8. See Table A in the appen-
dix for descriptive statistics on the four dependent variables 
included in Table 1.
Independent Variables
Our key independent variable is the construct of  trust in 
foreigners. We operationalize this variable as an additive in-
dex constructed with a series of  items asking respondents 
how much they trust people of  different foreign countries, 
namely, citizens of  the United States, Canadians, Argentin-
eans, Brazilians, Chileans, Colombians, and Cubans. Re-
sponse options ranged from “not at all” (0) to “a great deal” 
(3). These seven items load into one single dimension with 
a minimum factor loading of  0.658 (citizens of  the United 
States) and a maximum factor loading of  0.954 (both Ar-
gentineans and Brazilians). These items produce a reliable 
scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of  0.955. For the purposes of  
our analyses, we constructed a simple additive index, which 
provides a measure that ranges from 0 to 21, where 0 indi-
cates the lowest level of  trust in foreigners and 21 indicates 
the highest level of  trust.
Control Variables
Our analyses control for a number of  usual suspects. The 
first is generalized trust. As the literature has suggested in the 
past, it could simply be the case that individuals with high 
levels of  generalized trust are more likely to trust anyone, 
conational or not. Therefore, it is critical that we account for 
levels of  generalized trust. Respondents were asked whether 
most people can be trusted (1) or whether one should never 
be too trusting in dealing with people (0). It is important to 
note that the correlation between generalized trust and our 
construct of  trust in foreigners is only .036 (significant at the 
p < .10 level). In other words, trust in foreigners and gener-
alized trust are positively correlated but the relationship is 
weak, suggesting that the two constructs in fact capture dif-
ferent concepts.
Another variable we control for is individual news con-
sumption patterns. According to Walter Lippmann (1922, 
16), “the real environment is altogether too big, too com-
plex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance,” and as such 
people rely on simplified representations of  the world as 
images in their heads. Research has examined the media 
as the lens through which people obtain information about 
the world outside their immediate environment (see, for ex-
ample, Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar and Kinder 
1987). People do not necessarily obtain all of  their infor-
mation about the world from the media, but we expect that 
differing degrees of  media consumption surely have sig-
nificant effects on what realities individuals endorse. We 
think this is especially true when it comes to foreign af-
fairs as people are most likely to gain information and im-
pressions about anything foreign from the media, as recent 
studies have shown that knowledge of  international affairs 
varies according to the amount of  international news cov-
erage in a country4 (Iyengar et al. 2009; Norris 2012; Nor-
ris and Inglehart 2009).
Admittedly, it is not scope of  the present study to assess 
the amount or the content of  international news coverage in 
Mexico. Our empirical models, however, account for indi-
vidual levels of  news consumption. Respondents were asked 
how frequently they followed the news using three different 
media: television, radio, and newspapers. These three indi-
vidual measures5 were simply added to construct a scale that 
ranges from 0 to 9, where 0 indicates that the individual does 
not use any of  these media outlets at all and 9 indicates that 
the individual uses all of  them frequently.
Nationalism, ideology, and partisanship are also related 
to transnational policies. In the United States where most 
of  this research has been done, conservatives and Republi-
cans are more supportive of  free trade and less supportive 
of  immigration than liberals and Democrats (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014; Uslaner 1998). National pride tends to 
drive opinions on all three areas, with those higher in na-
tional pride or nationalism being more opposed to NAFTA, 
immigration, and regional integration (Davis 1998; Hainm-
ueller and Hopkins 2014; Merolla et al. 2005). We include 
individual views on national sovereignty, ideology, and party 
identification in our analysis.
The variable national sovereignty is constructed using an 
item that asked respondents to indicate how important na-
tional sovereignty is, ranging from “not important at all” 
(1) to “very important” (10). Ideology is constructed us-
ing a question asking respondents to indicate where they 
would locate themselves in the political spectrum if  1 means 
“left” and 10 means “right.” Those respondents who did 
not provide an answer to this question (10.5 percent of  re-
spondents) were assigned the mean value of  the rest of  the 
sample (M = 6.246), and an indicator variable labeled non-
ideologue was also incorporated into our models to determine 
whether these individuals have systematically different atti-
tudes than their “ideologue” counterparts. Regarding par-
tisan identifications in Mexico, there are three main politi-
cal parties: the Democratic Revolution Party (Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática [PRD]), the Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI]), 
and the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional 
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Table 1. The Impact of Trust in Foreigners on Transnational Policies among the Mexican Public.
  Immigration policy    Trust in NAFTA
 Estimate  SE  Estimate   SE
Trust in foreigners  0.074***  (0.009)  0.182***  (0.010)
Generalized trust  −0.237†  (0.144)  −0.043  (0.144)
News consumption  −0.023 (0.021)  0.062**  (0.021)
National sovereignty  0.071***  (0.022)  0.008  (0.022)
Ideology  0.038*  (0.018)  0.024  (0.017)
Nonideologue  −0.031  (0.169)  −0.369*  (0.168)
Partisan identification
PRD partisan  −0.173  (0.155)  0.104  (0.156)
PRI partisan  0.100  (0.108)  0.008  (0.107)
PAN partisan  0.027  (0.122)  0.385***  (0.120)
Respondent has relatives in the United States  −0.091  (0.090)  0.260**  (0.089)
Education (in number of schooling years)  0.021†  (0.011)  0.016  (0.011)
Income (in thousands of pesos per month)  0.011  (0.011)  −0.009  (0.011)
Region of the country
North  0.135  (0.114)  0.000  (0.113)
West  0.051  (0.138)  −0.009  (0.138)
South  0.017  (0.119)  0.115  (0.118)
ϰ1  −0.482**  (0.248)  0.520*  (0.245)
ϰ2  0.807***  (0.247)  2.346***  (0.251)
ϰ3  3.296***  (0.260)  4.506***  (0.269)
N  1,862  1,881
−2 log likelihood  4,493.93  4,386.23
χ2 for LR test  119.52  489.99
Prob > χ2  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R2  .062  .229
    Merging Mexico and the United States
  Quality of life     Cultural/political
 Coefficient   SE   Coefficient   SE
Trust in foreigners  0.049**  (0.017)  0.013  (0.011)
Generalized trust  −0.555*  (0.276)  0.118  (0.167)
News consumption  0.130***  (0.039)  0.048*  (0.024)
National sovereignty  −0.021  (0.041)  −0.142***  (0.025)
Ideology  0.077*  (0.033)  0.043*  (0.020)
Nonideologue  −1.333***  (0.324)  −0.804***  (0.199)
Partisan identification
PRD partisan  −0.095  (0.294)  −0.162  (0.180)
PRI partisan  0.417*  (0.204)  −0.275*  (0.124)
PAN partisan  0.598**  (0.230)  −0.532***  (0.140)
Respondent has relatives in the United States  0.347*  (0.169)  0.166†  (0.103)
Education (in number of schooling years)  −0.055*  (0.022)  −0.029*  (0.013)
Income (in thousands of pesos per month)  −0.038†  (0.021)  −0.034**  (0.013)
Region of the country
North  0.750***  (0.216)  0.291*  (0.131)
West  −0.201  (0.261)  0.440**  (0.160)
South  −0.645**  (0.225)  0.791***  (0.138)
Constant  6.927***  (0.465)  3.348***  (0.250)
N  1,821  1,834
F(15, 1821)  8.866  9.574
Prob > F  0.000  0.000
Adjusted R2  .060  .066
Table entries are Ordered Logistic Regression estimates (top) or OLS Regression coefficients (bottom); standard errors are in parentheses. NAFTA = 
North American Free Trade Agreement; PRD = Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PRI = Partido Revolucionario Institucional; PAN = Partido Ac-
ción Nacional; LR = Likelihood Ratio.
† p < .10 ; * p < .05 ; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001 ; two-tailed test.
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[PAN]). Generally speaking, the PRD can be considered a 
left/center-left party and the PAN a center-right/right party, 
whereas the PRI has displayed considerable movement from 
left to right and back to more centrist positions throughout 
its history. In our analysis, respondents’ partisan identifica-
tions were incorporated into the analyses with three indica-
tor variables, PRD Partisan, PRI partisan, and PAN partisan, 
where the reference category is individuals who do not re-
port any partisan attachment.
The more people are in contact with others, the more they 
can learn about them. Whether contact increases trust in 
outgroups is still under debate. The contact hypothesis pos-
its that diversity in a society leads people to experience in-
creased contact with outgroups and thereby develop more fa-
vorable attitudes, including trust, toward the outgroups (e.g., 
Forbes 1997; Putnam 2007). Empirical results, however, have 
been mixed. In our analysis, we include an indicator vari-
able to denote whether the respondent has family or relatives in 
the United States (1) or not (0). This variable serves as a proxy 
for means of  potential direct contact with foreigners or alter-
native exposure to information about foreigners other than 
that provided by traditional media outlets.
We also take into account prevailing explanations for 
support for NAFTA and immigration, specifically eco-
nomic explanations (see, for example, Davis 1998). Peo-
ple who are likely to be harder hit in economic terms by 
transnational policies are poorer people who work in cer-
tain types of  jobs, such as manufacturing or agriculture. Re-
search shows that socioeconomic status is related to support 
for NAFTA and immigration policies. We therefore include 
both income and education in our analysis. Our measure 
of  education reflects the number of  years of  formal school-
ing completed by respondents. Income reflects estimates of  
respondents’ household income in thousands of  pesos per 
month using the midpoint of  the range included in the orig-
inal categories in the survey. Finally, three indicator vari-
ables to account for regional differences are incorporated 
in our model: North, West, and South, where the reference 
category is the Central region.6 See Table A in the appen-
dix for descriptive statistics on the independent variables 
included in the model.
Love Thy Neighbor, Share Thy Land? 
Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the results of  four different regression 
models. The first two models, regarding immigration policy 
preferences and trust in NAFTA, respectively, are estimated us-
ing ordered logistic regressions. The remaining two mod-
els, concerning merging Mexico and the United States (both the 
quality of  life and the cultural and political autonomy dimen-
sions), are estimated using OLS regressions. As can be seen, 
the coefficient of  trust in foreigners is both positive and sta-
tistically significant in three out of  four of  the models in-
cluded in Table 1. Collectively, these results provide evidence 
supporting our central hypotheses that trust in foreigners in-
forms individual preferences about immigration policy, indi-
vidual attitudes toward international trade, and (under cer-
tain circumstances) individual attitudes toward international 
regional integration.
We begin with immigration policy. The positively signed 
and statistically significant coefficient of  trust in foreigners pro-
vides corroboration for the expectation that individuals with 
higher levels of  trust in foreign publics are also more likely 
to hold less restrictive preferences when it comes to immi-
gration policy, net of  generalized trust, individual patterns 
of  news consumption, levels of  importance attached to na-
tional sovereignty, ideological predispositions, partisan iden-
tifications, whether or not respondents have family members 
or relatives living abroad (in the United States), as well as 
education and income levels and regional differences. Criti-
cally here, it is important to emphasize that this result holds 
even after controlling generalized trust. In fact, the coeffi-
cient of  generalized trust is negative and significant at the p 
< .10 level, which suggests that, at least in Mexico, general-
ized trust is not positively correlated with attitudes toward 
immigration.7 We will come back to this point during our 
concluding remarks.
To facilitate further the discussion of  results, we sum-
marized them graphically in Figure 1, where we report pre-
dicted probabilities of  supporting different immigration 
policies. The vertical axis is the predicted probability of  sup-
porting less restrictive immigration policies and the hori-
zontal axis is our construct of  trust in foreigners. The rest 
of  the predictors were held at their mean value or at their 
modal category. The original survey item offered four dif-
ferent possible outcomes, but we grouped them into two cat-
egories for ease of  interpretation.8 We grouped predicted 
probabilities for respondents who would prefer not to al-
low immigration at all or who would want to impose very 
strict limits on it to represent opposition to immigration. 
We grouped the predicted probabilities for respondents who 
would allow immigration depending upon job availability 
or allowing anyone to enter to represent positive views of  
immigration.
As can be seen in Figure 1, at the lowest end of  our scale 
of  trust in foreigners, the gap between preferring a highly re-
strictive immigration policy (above 80 percent) and a rela-
tively more open door one (below 20 percent) is over 60 per-
centage points. This gap, however, narrows, vanishes, and 
reverses in the opposite direction along the scale of  trust 
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in foreigners. In fact, at the highest end of  the scale, about 
60 percent of  individuals prefer more open door immigra-
tion policy options, whereas roughly 40 percent of  individu-
als prefer the highly restrictive options. This represents over 
a 40 percentage point shift in the predicted probabilities of  
supporting either side of  the debate about immigration pol-
icy when we move across the full range of  the scale of  trust 
in foreigners, taking into account generalized trust and the 
rest of  our control variables.
The next dependent variable analyzed in Table 1, as we 
move from left to right, is trust in NAFTA. These results are 
computed utilizing an ordered logistic regression model. The 
coefficient of  trust in foreigners is, again, both positive and 
statistically significant, providing further support to the hy-
pothesis that trust in foreigners has a significant impact on 
attitudes toward transnational policies such as international 
trade, captured here with our measure of  trust in NAFTA. 
Specifically, our analysis strongly suggests that individuals 
with higher levels of  trust in foreigners are more likely to 
hold positive attitudes toward NAFTA than their counter-
parts with lower levels of  trust in foreigners.
To further illustrate the magnitude of  the effect of  trust 
in foreigners on trust in NAFTA among Mexican citizens, 
Figure 2 summarizes graphically our key result regarding the 
relationship between trust in foreigners and attitudes toward 
international trade. The vertical axis is the predicted prob-
ability of  holding greater levels of  trust in NAFTA and the 
horizontal axis is our construct of  trust in foreigners. The 
rest of  the predictors were held at their mean value or at their 
modal category. The original survey item offered four dif-
ferent possible outcomes. Here, however, we again grouped 
the original responses into two categories for ease of  inter-
pretation.9 We grouped the predicted probabilities of  having 
“none” and “little” trust in NAFTA to represent low levels of  
trust in this international trade agreement among the Mex-
ican public. We grouped the predicted probabilities of  hav-
ing “some” and “very much” trust in NAFTA to represent 
high levels of  trust in this transnational policy. As should be 
clear from Figure 2, the effect of  trust in foreigners on atti-
tudes toward NAFTA is even stronger than its effect on im-
migration policy preferences. In this case, predicted proba-
bilities of  having relatively high levels of  trust in NAFTA 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of immigration policy preferences by trust in foreigners.
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rise from roughly 20 to 80 percent when we move from the 
lowest to the highest end of  our scale of  trust in foreigners. 
Similarly, the predicted probabilities of  having relatively low 
levels of  trust in NAFTA decrease from roughly 80 to 20 per-
cent when we move across the full range of  our main inde-
pendent variable. These results provide strong corroboration 
to our expectation that our key construct, trust in foreign-
ers, also accounts for the formation of  individual attitudes 
toward international trade.
Continuing our reading of  Table 1, moving from left to 
right, the third dependent variable is the improving quality 
of  life dimension. Here, we offer the results of  an OLS re-
gression model.10 As can be seen, the coefficient of  trust in 
foreigners is both positive and statistically significant. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates this relationship further. The vertical axis 
is the predicted levels of  supporting the proposition that 
Mexico and the United States become one country. The 
scale ranges from 0 to 12. The horizontal axis is our con-
struct of  trust in foreigners. The rest of  the control vari-
ables were held at their mean value or at their modal cate-
gory. Moving from the lowest level of  trust in foreigners to 
the highest level increases support for merging Mexico and 
the United States a bit over one full point in this scale. And 
once again, it is important to note that this effect holds af-
ter controlling for generalized trust, which has a negative 
sign and also attains statistical significance. In other words, 
whereas trust in foreigners helps foster positive attitudes 
toward regional integration when individuals in Mexico 
have potential improvements for their standards of  living 
in mind, generalized trust pulls their opinions in the op-
posite direction.
Finally, the results for our fourth dependent variable are 
computed using OLS regression, where the dependent vari-
able, the cultural and political autonomy dimension, is our con-
struct for the cultural and political consequences of  the hy-
pothetical integration of  Mexico with the United States. In 
this model, the coefficient of  trust in foreigners remains pos-
itively signed, but for the first time, it fails to attain statisti-
cal significance. When Mexican citizens are prompted to 
think of  the political and cultural consequences of  blurring 
the border between Mexico and the United States, support 
for cultural and political integration is low compared to sup-
port for economic integration and does not vary with the de-
gree to which people trust foreigners.
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of levels of trust in NAFTA by trust in foreigners. NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement.
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Given that the questions about international regional in-
tegration available to us are specific about merging Mexico 
and the United States, one is left to wonder whether this last 
set of  results would look any different by incorporating trust 
in U.S. citizens instead of  trust in foreigners as our key indepen-
dent variable in the model.11 The results of  this exercise are 
available in Table C in the supplemental appendix (http://
prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/). As can be seen, once we 
incorporate trust in U.S. citizens rather than our more com-
prehensive trust in foreigners construct as the key indepen-
dent variable, the coefficient associated with trust in the for-
eign neighbors of  the north is both positive and statistically 
significant. Figure 1 in the supplemental appendix illustrates 
the effect of  trust in U.S. citizens on individuals’ preference 
regarding merging Mexico and the United States into one 
country (see supplemental appendix). Admittedly, moving 
from the lowest level of  trust in U.S. citizens to the highest 
level of  trust, support for merging Mexico and the United 
States increases by three quarters of  a point in this 8-point 
scale. The predicted levels of  support for this hypothetical re-
gional international integration, however, remain relatively 
low (they never reach the midpoint of  the y-axis) across the 
full range of  the scale of  trust in U.S. citizens.
In sum, trust in foreigners seems to foster positive atti-
tudes toward regional integration with the United States, 
but only when individuals in Mexico have potential improve-
ments for their standards of  living in mind. When individ-
uals are prompted to think about the possibility of  Mexico 
losing its cultural identity or of  Mexico becoming thirty-two 
new states of  the United States of  America, trust in foreign-
ers becomes statistically irrelevant. When we introduce the 
concept of  trust in U.S. citizens, which proves to be statis-
tically significant, substantively speaking, the levels of  sup-
port for regional international integration remain relatively 
low. In other words, the Mexican public seems to love their 
northern neighbors to the point of  sharing Mexico’s terri-
tory if  this would bring the Mexican public a better quality 
of  life but not if  this would mean the loss of  cultural or po-
litical autonomy.
Conclusion
In an increasingly globalized world, people will be called 
on to react to policies that involve their own country inter-
acting with neighboring countries. From this perspective, 
Figure 3. Predicted levels of support for merging Mexico and the United States (quality of life) by trust in foreigners.
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gaining a better understanding of  what drives attitudes to-
ward these transnational policies is increasingly relevant for 
political scientists, especially given the complexity and am-
biguity of  these policies. Our research contributes to this 
understanding in two key ways. First, although previous re-
search has shown that people who are more trusting in gen-
eral are more likely to support more cooperative internation-
alist policies, this study demonstrates convincingly that the 
referent for trust matters and that trust in foreigners, not gen-
eralized trust, is a particularly powerful predictor of  transna-
tional policy attitudes. People who trust their regional neigh-
bors are likely to support increased interactions with them 
through trade policies, immigration, and political and cul-
tural exchanges.
It is possible, of  course, that these transnational policies 
affect people’s trust in foreigners, that is, that the causal ar-
row heads in the opposite direction. We think it unlikely that 
this is the case. Despite the predictive power of  economic 
self-interest and domestic political attitudes (e.g., Kalten-
thaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004), opinions regarding trans-
national policies like trade policies (including NAFTA) and 
outsourcing are largely driven by feelings toward outgroups 
and intergroup dynamics (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009, 2013). 
Although attitudes about “us” vs. “them,” trust, and national 
identity develop early in life (Hess and Torney 1967; Rahn 
and Transue 1998), before children become aware of  trans-
national policies and their effects, it makes sense to predict 
that trust in foreigners affects transnational policy attitudes 
rather than the other way around. Much more research needs 
to be done, however, on the various referents of  trust because, 
as our research shows, the concept of  generalized trust is too 
vague and amorphous. The trust people feel toward groups 
relevant to particular policy areas is what drives their atti-
tudes toward those policies.
Our second major contribution arises from our decision 
to study Mexican attitudes toward transnational policies. 
Much of  the work on the relationship between trust and 
foreign policy attitudes has been limited to studying the at-
titudes of  people in the United States or other advanced in-
dustrialized countries. This is problematic because of  the 
multinational nature of  transnational policies. Public opin-
ion on all sides of  a transnational policy agreement is likely 
to significantly influence policy outcomes— not just public 
opinion in the more industrialized countries. Moving this re-
search question to Mexico introduces a necessary dynamic 
to this research agenda. It opens the door for a greater de-
gree of  generalizability in the models used to explain public 
opinion toward transnational policies because it addresses 
the viewpoints of  the less wealthy and industrialized part-
ners in these agreements.
Furthermore, unlike the United States, Mexico is not a 
world superpower and instead is that superpower’s next-door 
neighbor. Many countries involved in transnational policy 
agreements find themselves in a similar position, in that they 
live next door to a much more powerful neighbor. Countries 
surrounding Western Europe and Russia immediately come 
to mind. Our findings indicate that generalized trust plays 
a different role in Mexicans’ foreign policy attitudes than 
it does for Americans’ attitudes. What matters the most in 
Mexicans’ transnational policy attitudes is trust in foreign-
ers, not generalized trust.12 Whether this finding holds up in 
other countries involved in transnational policy agreements 
with more powerful neighbors is an important topic for future 
research. We think it makes sense, though, that trust would 
play out differently in the powerful and less powerful coun-
tries. People in less powerful countries are in some ways at 
the mercy of  their powerful neighbors. Trusting some vague 
notion of  “people” is not as important in deciding to support 
a certain transnational policy as trusting the people who are 
involved in the policies. What is important is figuring out if  
the people who live in nearby countries are trustworthy. Peo-
ple in the more powerful countries, who have been the tar-
get of  almost all of  the public opinion research in this area, 
simply do not need to be as concerned about trusting their 
neighboring countries because their country can more readily 
make things right if  things go wrong. Future research should 
examine how generalized trust and trust in foreigners plays 
out in other countries, especially less powerful countries that 
have largely been ignored in previous research.
Increased globalization and the need for agreements 
among countries to deal with transnational issues heighten 
the importance of  understanding public opinion about trans-
national policies. Our research points to trust, and especially 
trust in foreigners, as a key element in people’s support for 
these policies. People are not only concerned about their 
own pocketbooks or their country’s economic well-being, but 
they also care about the trustworthiness of  regional neigh-
bors who are involved in the issue. Without that trust, peo-
ple will be much less likely to support their government’s in-
volvement in these transnational policies.
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Appendix
Table A. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable  N  M  SD  Minimum  Maximum
Dependent
Immigration policy preference  2,288  1.585  0.898  0  3
Trust in NAFTA  2,244  1.236  0.934  0  3
Merging Mexico and the United States
Quality of life dimension  2,242  7.746  3.656  0  12
Cultural and political dimension  2,240  2.517  2.193  0  8
Independent
Index of trust in foreigners  2,140  4.829  5.088  0  21
Trust in people from North America
Trust in U.S. citizens  2,276  0.874  0.894  0  3
Trust in Canadians  2,200  0.760  0.866  0  3
Trust in people from Latin America
Trust in Argentineans  2,165  0.622  0.787  0  3
Trust in Brazilians  2,165  0.649  0.801  0  3
Trust in Chileans  2,162  0.646  0.797  0  3
Trust in Colombians  2,166  0.624  0.787  0  3
Trust in Cubans  2,170  0.653  0.808  0  3
Generalized trust  2,380  0.098  0.298  0  1
Index of news consumption  2,371  5.716  2.256  0  9
News consumption from TV  2,374  2.413  0.807  0  3
News consumption from radio  2,375  1.770  1.022  0  3
News consumption from newspapers  2,374  1.535  1.089  0  3
National sovereignty  2,285  8.288  2.065  1  10
Ideology  2,380  6.246  2.565  1  10
Nonideologue  2,380  0.105  0.307  0  1
Partisan identification
PRD partisan  2,380  0.094  0.291  0  1
PRI partisan  2,380  0.274  0.446  0  1
PAN partisan  2,380  0.192  0.394  0  1
R has family or relatives in the United States  2,376  0.467  0.499  0  1
Education (in number of schooling years)  2,375  8.348  4.420  0  17
Income (in thousands of pesos per month)  2,160  4.201  4.322  1.25  35
Region of the country
North  2,380  0.277  0.447  0  1
West  2,380  0.156  0.363  0  1
Central  2,380  0.346  0.476  0  1
South  2,380  0.210  0.407  0  1
NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement; PRD = Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PRI = Partido Revolucionario Insti-
tucional; PAN = Partido Acción Nacional.
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Notes
1. Wittkopf  (1990) distinguishes between two faces of  internation-
alism: militant and cooperative. Militant internationalism refers 
to support for the use of  military force, whereas cooperative in-
ternationalism refers to working with other countries, such as 
through economic aid and involvement in international orga-
nizations (see Chanley 1999).
2. Brewer et al. (2004) introduce the concept of  international trust, 
defined as “a generalized belief  about whether most foreign 
countries behave in accordance with normative expectations re-
garding the conduct of  nations” (p. 96, emphasis added). They 
find strong support for their argument that international trust 
is a strong predictor of  support for humanitarian aid and mili-
tary action. Although this research makes an important contri-
bution to the literature on foreign policy attitudes, we are inter-
ested in social trust and therefore focus on trust in people rather 
than trust in nations.
3. See the supplemental appendix (http://prq.sagepub.com/ sup-
plemental/) for the original survey question wordings both in 
English and Spanish for all of  the variables included in the fol-
lowing analyses.
4. Our data set, however, does not include questions regarding 
knowledge of  international affairs.
5. These three items load into one single dimension with a mini-
mum loading factor of  0.717 (TV) and a maximum factor load-
ing of  0.809 (radio), and produce a reliable scale with a Cron-
bach’s alpha of  0.651.
6. The North region includes the states of  Baja California, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, 
San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. 
The West region includes Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, 
Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, and Querétaro. The Central region 
includes the Federal District and the states of  Hidalgo, México, 
Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. Finally, the South region in-
cludes Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, 
Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán.
7. An anonymous reviewer suggested to rerun all the models with 
only trust in foreigners and only generalized trust. Our results 
remain substantively unaltered. Only in one of  the four mod-
els did interpersonal trust have a different sign in the absence 
of  trust in foreigners in the models, going from negative .04 to 
positive .04 but remained statistically insignificant. In all of  the 
other models, the two constructs preserved their sign, size, and 
significance (or lack thereof).
8. After grouping the four possible outcomes into two categories, 
we reran the model using logistic regression. The results are sta-
tistically similar and substantively the same. Predicted proba-
bilities are estimated using the logistic regression model avail-
able in Table B in the supplemental appendix.
9. After grouping the four original outcomes into two categories, 
we reran the model using logistic regression. The empirical re-
sults are statistically similar and substantively the same. Pre-
dicted probabilities in Figure 2 are estimated using the logistic 
regression model available in Table B in the supplemental 
appendix.
10. An anonymous reviewer suggested using ordered logit instead 
and another anonymous reviewer recommended utilizing a to-
bit model with censoring. We reran Model 3 under those two 
specifications and the results rendered statistically similar and 
substantively the same results. Therefore, for ease of  interpre-
tation, we decided to keep our original OLS regression results.
11. We thank an anonymous reviewer for calling our attention to 
this possibility.
12. Cleary and Stokes (2006) argue that higher levels of  interper-
sonal trust in Mexico are generally found in less democratic re-
gions of  the country and are rooted in relatively closed com-
munities, which we believe would make these individuals more 
likely to be opposed to the effects of  transnational policies.
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